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Exile Government in the Armenian Polity

Khachig Tololyan
Wesleyan University

Overall Claims and Theoretical Implications
Exile is nearly as old as human polity, but the conce pt of
a government-in-exile is a modem invention. a product of the
period in which the nation-state became dominant. During this
era. Armenians had a nation-state for only two and on e half
years, from May 28, 1918 to December 2. 1920. This stu dy will
deal with the fate of that slate's government after 1l was dep osed
by the Red Anny, which reconquered the briefly indepen dent
former provinces of the Tzarist Empire in the Transcaucas us .
But the usefulness of the Armenian case to a more gene ral
investigation of the topic of exile governments is not limite d to
this instance ; indeed . the example cannot be understoo d , and,
more importantly. its potential relevance to a needed revis ion of
our theories concerning governments -in-exile cannot be fulfilled. without a more extended consideration of Arme nian
political culture in exile . This diasporan polity was and is highly
organized. maintains contacts with the population living in the
home territories. and over the centuries has developed a government of exiles and by exiles that envisages itself as respo nsible
for and leading the entire nation . Of course. there is always an
element of wishful thinking in the claims of exiles; neverthe less.
the tenacity and resilience of lhe evolvingAnnenian govern ments
Qf exile is rarely equalled in the history of diasporas. In the
perspective provided by the long trajectory of Armenian exile, the
government-in-exile of 1921-1924 is a brief though signifi cant
episode . Considered in broader context, the Armenian case
raises questions about our definitions of the core categ ories
"government" and "exile".
The Armenian example illustrates the limitati on s of
focusing on the formal diplomatic recognition extende d lo a
government-in-exile as lhe sole or even primary index of its
legitimacy and importance, and especially of doing so at the
expense of the socio-cultural roots of political phenomena . Such
a narrow formalism obscures other factors that are equa lly vilal
to the meaningful survival of exile governments . The form alist
and statist analysis arrives at conclusions that are alrea dy built
into the assumptions of the powers that create government s-in-

124

exile, namely, that they will survive so long as they serve the
mterests of their patrons; they are "cards, not players," in the
words of an anonymous British diplomat'. Indeed, the Armenian
government-in-exile ceased to exist when tacit recognition of its
status by the Western powers lapsed after they signed the Treaty
of Lausanne in 1923. But its disappearance was not crucial. It
was assimilated into the long-familiar government of exile, and
its leaders joined the cadres of political institutions already in
place .
With the possible exception of traditional despotic regimes. governments perform services for civil society in order to
sustain their legitimacy.
Governments-in-exile are often an
exception : their survival and success can depend on the efficacy
with which they serve the foreign policy interests of the major
powers that are their patrons. In contrast, the survival and
success of a government of exiles like the Armenian depends on
the services it performs for its co-nationals in exile - and
sometimes even for those under rival regimes at home. It requires
no patron-state. Indeed, it flourishes in an absence of state
concern, which is why it attained its peak under the weak
governments of "confessional" Lebanon between 1945 and 1975.
It does require its host's tolerance of its existence; where the
centralized state is intent on providing every service and rejecting
the claim of non-state institutions to do the same, as in France,
even a prosperous community like the Franco-Armenian does
not develop a strong "branch" of transnational, diasporan exile
government.
During much of its history, the Armenian government of
exiles extended far more services to its co-nationals than most
diplomatically recognized governments-in-exile tried to or succeeded in providing. Lacking the resources. traditions. institutions. cadres and will. such governments-in-exile (those of the
Baltic Republics. or Poland. or Norway, during World War II, say,
or Spain's after Franco's victory) have performed few services for
the exile population they worked with; even when they endure for
decades, as the Baltic ones did, they have not sunk into the exile
community the political roots that services of certain kinds
engender, whereas in certain times and places Armenian governments of exile performed for their co-nationals functions we
associate with local provincial governments, at times even with
a state .
In addition, and in compensation for its inability to effect
a transition towards sovereignty, the Armenian government of
exiles has done considerable work of political organization and
cultural production, of the sort which preserves, invigorates and
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invents the concepts. narratives and symbols that empower
exiles to live on as a collectivity, or at least to represent their
situation as such to themselves and others . Direct or indirect
participation in cultural production is part of the task of the
political class in any polity, national or other. Analyses of the
sources of the legitimacy of all governments. at home or in exile
must look not only at their continuity with previous regimes but
also at the way in which they influence both material and cultural
production. The nature of such production. as well as the
resources devoted to it, differs greatly in the cases of exile and
sovereign governments, but there is nevertheless an overlap
rather than a radical chasm between the two, as the Annenlan
case shows.
In what ls easily the best. as well as the most up-to-date
book on political exile, Yossl Shain clarifies the issues. He
identifies two urgent concerns that affect all polities in exile and
shape their behavior: "loyaltyMand "recognitlonM•. "LoyaltyMhere
refers to more than verbal expressions of adherence. First. the
term underscores the exile groups' need to define varieties of
"loyalMbehavior: It also emphasizes the problems of extracting
constant manifestations ofloyalty from co-nationals in exile and
at home, where they are ruled by the regime the exiles oppose.
The gravity of the latter problem is accentuated, first, by the fact
that co-nationals usually have the option of offering the same
behavior (their "loyaltyM)as testimony to the legitimacy of the
ruling regime ; secondly, they can usually do the latter at less
potential cost and with the hope of greater reward, since even
illegitimate regimes in power have greater resources with which
to reward or punish.
Shain's second term, "recognitlon.M refers to the international dimension of exile, to the fact that all operations of an exile
group or government depend, at a minimum, on receiving refuge
in a host country and permission to operate in as well as from it.
Of course, under optimal conditions, host/patron countries
extend various levels of diplomatic and material support, up to
and including recognition of a group as a government-in-exile.
Sometimes. recognition can have barely perceptible results for
decades. as when the U.S. continued to "supportM the governments-in-exile of the Baltic republics seized by Stalin's armies.
American refusal to legitimize that annexation seemed an insignificant epiphenomenon of the Cold War, but in the Gorbachev
era the inventiveness and daring of nationalist movements in
precisely these republics results in some part from that refusal.
The population of these regions withheld the full measure of
legitimating loyalty to the Soviet state in part because it was
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encouraged by the continued if symbolic life of governments-inexf}e, reminders of the lost past and possible future of such
"captive" nations.
The Armenians, who have been equally restive in the
Gorbachev era, have not had a comparable Western-recognized
government-in-exile to call upon, save briefly and ln unusual
circumstances between 1921 and 1924. Instead, alternately
cooperating and competing elites have worked through several
institutions as a government of exiles, plausibly claiming that
they represent the authentic interests and aspirations of the
",Armenian Nation." This nation has not been coextensive with a
sovereign nation-state, and half or more of its member have lived
in exile for centuries. Yet it has claimed the loyalty of the majority
of Armenians for more than a century, and of a plurality for even
longer. 3 Such loyalty has manifested itself in a double sphere of
operation: international, as when Armenians sent people they
considered representatives of national interests to great-power
conferences; but also intranational and intra-state, as when the
Sultans of the multi-ethnic Ottoman empire received at Court
legitimate Armenian representatives acknowledged as such by
their subjects.
When a government acquires legitimacy in democratic
elections and is then expelled by brute force (e.g. by Nazi
conquest), it carries this legitimacy with it. The legitimacy of a
government of exiles cannot equal this; therefore, this study runs
the risk of being perceived as a celebration of an implausible
legitimacy in exile. But to assert the longevity of the phenomenon
is not necessarily to claim that these governments of exile always
enjoyed the support of a majority, either in the homeland or in the
diaspora. The extent of such support is always notoriously
difficult to determine: the Allies found it hard to estimate in the
case of de Gaulle's "government" before 1943, say. In the
Armenian case, over centuries, in different diasporan locations.
under the rule of various kinds of states. ethnic and civic loyalties
fluctuated. The number of militant cadres has risen and fallen,
as has the number of those who have been actively supportive,
passively affiliated. or indifferently oriented away from ex.ilicand
ethnic politics and towards assimilation in the host society.
Nevertheless, the recognition and loyalty offered to the Armenian
exile governments was/is remarkable. whether assessed in
terms of duration, self-imposed fiscal levies. degree of commitment of volunteer labor and time, or in some cases the sacrifice
of life itself. This loyalty did not materialize as a spontaneous
outgrowth of national feeling, though Armenian historians are
occasionally guilty of the romantic assumption that its growth
127

was inevitable. Rather, the development of loyalty to a national
ideal and leadership was the result of successful efforts by exile
organizations to do the ideological and communal work that
renews the commitment of diasporan generations. The forging of
a national consensus in a transnational context is one of several
features of Armenian political history that makes it an unusual
case for students of exile governments.
This paper proposes that the case of the Armenian polity
requires that we retheortze governments-in-exile, and indeed the
range of meanings given to "government" itself. It will present its
argument historically. through an account of the way in which
a communal Armenian administration of minor notables eventually came to speak in the name of collective interests. then
established and led quasi-governmental coalitions in exile as
well as at home. all the while contending with internal challengers who, ironically. briefly came to power as leaders of a sovereign
state. This history reverses the normal trajectory, which moves
from nation-formation to nation-state. national government and
government-in-exile. In fact. the long development of quasigovernmental institutions in exilic enclaves• and at home preceded or was coextensive with the shaping of the Armenian
nation, which in tum created the nation-state of 1918-1920.
This variant of the dominant paradigm points to the limits of our
current, statist conceptions of governments-in-exile.
A less
formalist approach to such governments enables us to encompass under the "Armenian model" comparable - though not
identical - attempts at nation-making by quasi-governmental
exile elites within or beyond the borders of other multi-ethnic
states: Eritreans in Ethiopia or Greeks in the Ottoman Empire,
for example.
The Governments

of Exile Before the Government-in-Exil

e

(1375-1921)

When the last Armenian Kingdom. the Cilician, succumbed to the Mameluk armies in 1375, its King, Levon V.
traveled to the courts of Europe as an exile government of one.
failed to obtain assistance. and died there. The triple division of
the Armenians, which persists to this day, had already begun to
develop. Many remained in the homeland which, like Poland, was
partitioned among two and then three empires: Persian, Ottoman and (after 1828) Russian. Others lived in "intrastate diasporas," that is, in exile communities outside the home territories
but still within the boundaries of the three multi-ethnic empires
that also ruled the homeland. Finally. there were exiles who
formed diasporas in the West and Asia (e.g. India). While they
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were few, they were important because they included many
educated. prosperous and militant Armenians.
From 1375 to 1639. traditional Armenia was (badly) ruled
by conquerors: emigration and the size of the Armenian diaspora
increased steadily. The sense of belonging to a two thousand year
old culture receded in all areas of life except the religious.
Linguistic unity declined•. The aristocracy, which had survived
previous periods of foreign rule, was nearly exterminated. Vesuges of a local leadership consisting of some merchants and of
landowners remained. but declined: monasteries also declined
in prosperity and learning•.
Under these conditions of attenuated collective identity,
it was difTicult to develop a political elite. The chief Armenian
notables were clergymen or wealtny members of the "merchantdiaspora "1who gathered around the Church. which was the only
institution in Armenian life recognized by all and in touch with
all: if the Armenians were a "nation" at all. an azk. it was because
such an institution focused their collective activity and identity.
Significantly. azkis the word which came to mean "nation" later:
during this period it meant "folk" or "people" or. at best. "ethnonaUon."
As the chief administrative. juridical and representative
agency of this people, the Church had considerable power. After
the Fifteenth century. the Ottoman Empire ruled its non-Muslim
subjects by a system of millet-s. religious groupings whose
members reported to the Sultan through a clerical hierarchy. The
Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul spoke for, therefore "represented," the Empire's Armenians. both those in the Ottomanoccupied homeland and in the intra-state diaspora. The Patriarchate administered properties, had its own court and was
empowered to judge a range of cases: it even had a prison and
imposed certain punishments. Clerics and some lay administrators together were the nucleus of what would become the exile
leadership. It is worth reiterating that the Ottoman system did
not simply consist of a "Turkish" national dynasty ruling other
"nations" like the Greek or Armenian; rather, it was a multiethnic and multi-denominational
tributary empire in which the
Armenians in intrastate exile developed an infra-structure of
communal government that was put into place at the insistence
of the rulerse. In the Persian Empire, where there was no millet
system, wealthy merchants were prominent earlier. but always
acted around the symbolic center of the Church, with clerics as
at least nominal leaders. Here, too, Islam recognized religious
communities. not nations.
After 1639. centralized authority weakened in both the
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Ottoman and Persian Empires. Individual adventurers and
visionaries. then coalitions of elites claiming to speak for the
Armenian people, began to seek recognition from the European
powers, whom they approached in futile attempts to gain protection and even to create an autonomous political entity. These
failures were followed by David Beg's rebellion of the l 720's in the
Syunik and Karabagh regions (precisely those regions which are
in the news today for causing massive demonstrations in the
Armenian SSR}. This rebellion began when Armenian notables,
whose quasi-feudal privileges were threatened by Muslim overlords, sent emissaries to the exiles who had settled in the
independent Kingdom of Georgia, to the north . They persuaded
one David Beg to form and head a government begun in exile
rather than a government expelled to exile. A descendant of the
minor Armenian nobility, David Beg was a skilled officer of the
Georgian Army and seems to have had its tacit support, perhaps
in trade for a weakened Persia. He surprised the notables by
sustaining the rebellion for a decade, in the course of which he
punished, sometimes by execution, the petty lords who resisted
him . They wanted an impartial exile not implicated in local
conflicts: they got that. but also a leader whose vision of Armenia,
not shaped by local interests. was "national" in the modem
sense . Exiles and others removed from distracting local disputes
are often the first to envisage a nation•.
David Beg's rebellion showed that leaders from the
homeland and the diaspora could work together; Armenians
could be trained in exile and return to lead military formations.
His successes and failures provided the raw material for both
literary and popular narratives of resistance and nation-formation ; such narratives play a central role in the formation of
Armenian political culture, with effects that remain demonstrable down to modem Armenian terrorism •• and the Karabagh
movement in Soviet Armenta .
After the rebellion. from the l 740's to 1914, Armenians
working in the intrastate and overseas diasporas did the ideological and organizational work that fashioned their collectivity as a
transnational nation. that is as an entity that saw itself as a
nation. but existed without a state and across the boundaries of
Empires. This polity was endowed with a vital culture and a high
degree of internal. communal organization; elites struggled for
the control of its institutions and contested each other's claim to
represent the renascent nation in the eyes of its three imperial
rulers or in the courts of the European powers. These quasigovernments were possessed of two features essential to authority and legitimacy: they had continuity (the Patriarchate dated
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from 1461) and they were the providers of a remarkably large
range of services, especially in the Ottoman Armenian diaspora.
Such developments did not result from a plan or blueprtnt: they evolved in piecemeal fashion. Elites acted to meet
specific needs that declining and supremely indifferent empires
had no mechanisms which to attend. Such is the cunning of
history that those communal institutions which succeeded in
meeting these needs found that to do so was to be acknowledged
in quasi-governmental terms they had not sought, especially in
the Ottoman context, where for the leaders of a Christian millet
to be perceived as overtly political was literally to court death. A
cynical- or, depending upon one's temperament. a realistic assessment of elites that work to meet communal needs may
conclude that all such work is a prelude to power-seeking. But
in the situation of the diasportzed Armenian nation, the original
moU~es of the elites were far less ambitious. far more local and
contingent. Yet their successors found they had come to fulfill
more functions than governments-in-exile do. and to receive the
loyalty and recognition due to the same.
The Armenian elites attained quasi-governmental status
because, first in the intrastate diaspora and then in the homeland, they came to assume responsibility for neglected services.
The Church and its clergy, which functioned as a uniformed
bureaucracy offering an uninterrupted link to the Armenian
past, was omnipresent. though its authority slowly declined
under the impact of secularism. Within the Ottoman Empire, the
wealthy amiras (Armenians who had acquired wealth and status
as tax-farmers, financiers, industrialists and government appointees) struggled with the developing bourgeoisie of professionals and smaller businessmen for control of the millet'_s
administrative machinery, which became steadily more important as the elites competed to endow schools. charitable foundations. hospitals and cultural organizations. Within these institutions, a culture-rich and cash-poor "class" of petty intelligentsia
developed as a cadre. Aft.er 1789, but. above all after 1848, this
cadre helped to articulate a national idea and created a national
written language (1840-1870) which, without benefit of state
machinery, became the unifying language of the Armenians in a
fashion that has no exact parallels in pre-state format.ions• 1 • The
revival of Gaelic in Ireland and Hebrew in Palestine and Israel are
not directly comparable, because of differences in circumstance,
and the former. at least. is a failure compared to the success of
modern Armenian 12. It is no accident that this success took place
in an Ottoman Empire unwilling and unable to educate even its
Muslim subjects. let alone the Christians. This and other respon131

sibilities were left to a communal leadership, with th e sta te only
half-aware that to cede them to ethnonatlonal elites is to endow
them with a quasi-governmental legitimacy. should the y prove
successful.
In the Ottoman Armenian diaspora. and then increasingly in the homeland. the Armenian leadership was extr aordinarily successful. There was one school for this entire pop ulation
in 1790: in 1889 there were 540 elementary schools for the
approximately 2 million Armenian subjects of the Empire, or one
per 3700 inhabitants, a strikingly high figure for that time and
place' Exact figures are not available. but it is clear that at this
stage, with their Churches. schools and surprisingly large nu mber
of small and ephemeral newspapers. the Armenians had a petty
intelligentsia of clerics and laymen that numbered in the several
thousand and a linked petty leadership of several thousan d more
- businessmen. professionals. village chiefs who made u p the
political leadership of the home territories and intrastate exile. A
comparable network existed in the Tzarist empire. on a sm a ller
scale within the homeland but on an equally large sca le in the
intrastate diaspora, particularly in Thilisi, Georgia's capita l. the
majority of whose population was Armenian, and which wa s the
indisputable intellectual center of the Armenians in the Ru ssian
empire. There and in the Ottoman empire, the intrastate exile
elites dominated the home populations.
Until 1887, the elites had little regular contact ac ross the
boundaries of the hostile Ottoman and Tzarist empires. Then
transnational political parties were founded: first among students in Geneva and emigrants in Marseilles: then among
students at Russian universities. influenced by revoluti onary
socialism: and lastly in the home territories. Two impo rt ant
parties. the Hnchag and the Dashnag, were founded in 1887 and
1890; the former was more inclined to doctrinaire socialism: both
were deeply nationalist. They were later joined in the po litical
arena by more narrowly bourgeois, socialist, and comm unist
factions. Their existence made more explicit the competiti on for
the loyalty of the Armenian nation. Severe divisions arose. but
the very fact of competition by political parties undersco res the
governing if not quite governmental role of the comm unity
structures for whose control (or against which) they strugg led.
This became all the more true as that function of government
which includes dying and killing for the nation was undert aken
by the Hnchags and Dashnags, who organized self-de fense
groups in the homeland villages and terrorist activity in the
intrastate diasporas. At the same time, the parties soug ht to
politicize the petty intelligentsia-whose
most radicalized sector
3
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had founded them - and sought to direct the cultural producuon of exilic communities.
In the early stages of this competition, the Church held
an advantage which was made manifestly clear as late as 1878.
After the Russo-Turkish Warofl877-1878, at a conference of the
major European powers in Berlin, Armenian requests for Ottoman reforms were on the agenda. The question of who could
represent the Armenians was foregrounded because, in a sense.
the Empire's much-abused Armenians were bringing suit against
their sovereign in the Mcourt" of the conference. Though an
efficient lay elite existed. with new powers granted in a
Mconstitution" the Sultan gave the Armenian millet in 1863, it
was soon apparent that the Patriarch, Khrimian. was the only
figure acceptable to all as leader of the Armenian delegation . He
went to Berlin and came back empty-handed, but he vindicated
his mission in a way that still reverberates in Armenian discus sions of exile government.
In a speech to his disappointed flock. he described the
Berlin Conference in homely. familiar images as a feast at which
hari,sa. an Armenian dish with the consistency of mashed
potatoes. was seived: the other guests (nation-states with armies) came with "iron ladles" and seived themselves portions.
Khrimian said, whereas he had been sent with only a "paper
ladle" (promises of reform from the Sultan and European powers). This plain metaphor. elaborated in the rhetoric and political
discourse of generations. still recurs in the rhetoric of Armenian
exile today . What was for Khrimian a description of the limits of
exile government became for the radicals a prescription. a call to
arms. The persistence of the metaphor and its ability to structure
debate as recently as the l 970's, during the renewal of Armenian
terrorism, is astonishing••.
The founders of the political parties soon had to face the
urgent questions for which the "Iron Ladle" stood. The Armenian
conseivatives. the Sultan. the Tzar and the European powers
refused to recognize these parties as representatives of the
Armenians . However, having failed to protect the peasants of the
homeland from persecutions. which increased after 1878. the
traditional elites were vulnerable to competition from the new
parties . As the Hnchags and the Dashnags gained popularity
among what they correctly described as the oppressed Armenian
masses of the Ottoman and Tzarist empires. both responded with
an escalation of violence which led to imperial use of massacre
and pogrom as instruments of state policy.
Of course, neither government allowed the Armenians a
free press or elections that might confirm the loss of support for
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the traditional Armenian leaders. Repression accelerated the
development of underground party organizations in both empires; these maintained close contact between the home terrttories, the intrastate diasporas and the overseas diasporas, especially after the massacres of 1894-1896. They fought first to
defend the population, then to seek its autonomy; national
liberation came late to their agendas. By 1908 the parties had a
secret membership in the thousands and were supported by tens
of thousands of non -combatants . The Dashnags had an underground militia and the capacity to organize self-defense in
certain mountainous areas, to carry out terrorism elsewhere,
and to distribute forbidden newspapers printed overseas and
brought in from Persia or Bulgaria. Its leadership planned and
carried out actions from bases in Europe, the Russian Empire
and Persia. Its most spectacular actions included the seizure of
the Banque Ottomane in Istanbul, arguably the first act of
terrorist occupation or "hijacking" in history, and the raid of
Khanassor. Both were envisaged as specifically transnational
acts: that is , they were meant to convince the transnational
Armenian nation and the European powers that the Dashnag
party was a government, functioning both from exile and at
home, and that it had what others since David Beg had lacked:
arms and men, the will to use them even if it usually meant
losing, and a recognized role as a defender of the Armenian
nation .
The seizure of the Banque Ottomane ended in publicity,
the deaths of most of the attackers and safe-conduct for those
surviving the occupation. Khanassor, which took place on July
24-26, 1897, was the more remarkable transnational event. It
involved a battalion-size force armed with Russian, Turkish and
German weapons, assembled and trained in Russian and Persian territory, equipped with banners and a clear command
structure that gave the temporary unit a military cast. Members
of the unit came from the home territories and exile. They crossed
the Russo-Persian border, raided and severely damaged the
encampment of Kurds responsible for the massacre of 800
Armenians. At the time, this event was celebrated by Armenians;
over the years, it became a topic of song and story, an event
etched in memory as proof that the nation had not only masters
like the Tzar and the Sultan , but its own defenders and leaders
in the Dashnag Party, which henceforth became the most
persistent and success[ ul modem aspirant to governmental
status at home and in exile••.
The enduring significance of Khanassor is indicated by
the fact that some Armenians tum to it as a paradigm even now.
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Thus. an Editorial headlined (in Armenian) "We Need New
J{hanassors" appeared (July 28, 1989) in the moderate weekly
Hye Gyank("Armenian Life")of Los Angeles (circulation 10,000).
Pointing to the killings of Soviet Armenian citizens in Soviet
,Azerbaijan. which have remained unpunished and under-reported, it states: 'We need new Khanassors to strike at and
restrain the Azeris who threaten our compatriots." Running on
the name of the Dashnag party. which means "harmonious
federation," the editorial calls for the renewal of a federation of
defenders. a role the government of the Armenian SSR, which
has no army, does not fulfill:"We need those who would make
new Khanassors," concludes the article - a new entity that can
defend Armenians in and beyond the Soviet Union against Azeris
and Turkey (cited elsewhere in the piece). Khanassor enabled a
political party, operating in exile and the home territories both,
to claim the most indispensable function of government. the
right to make war in defense of the nation. Between 1897 and
1908, the Dashnag underground Jedayees fought frequently
against Kurds and Turks in the Ottoman Empire, and in 19051907 in the Tzarist Empire, against the Azeris, in the course of
events which there is no room to discuss here.
In 1908, the Young Turk Junta seized power in the
Ottoman state and took faltering steps to modernize its politics.
The next six years were marked by the first democratic competition in the ranks of the Armenian elites. To counter the
socialism of the Hnchags and Dashnags. the bourgeoisie formed
the Ramgavar-Sahmanatragan (Democratic-Constitutional) Party
(1908), which was allied with the philanthropic Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU). founded in 1906: the fiscal
resources of the latter remain the single largest economic force
in ex:ilicpublic life (an endowment of$75 million in 1988). These
groups, allied with the church, competed with the two more
radical parties. By 1914, the Dashnags were the most important
but not the dominant force in the transnational nation, managing its civic life in a loose and uneasy relationship with others,
with room for discursive struggle.
During the period 1908-1914, the traditional elites came
into closer contact with their co-nationals across the OttomanTzarist boundary, leading to an alliance of major consequences,
and created at the initiative of the Catholicos Kevork V. This
cleric held a position that made his ancient predecessors head of
the Armenian Church in the Armenian Kingdom: the prestige
(but not always the actual power) of the position did and does
overshadow that of any other Armenian cleric. To bolster it in the
new transnational arena, the Catholicos allied himself with
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Boghos Noubar Pasha, a founder of the AGBU, the leading
conservative notable of his day and one of the two or three
wealthiest Armenians in the world ; his family was of Ottoman
Armenian descent and had managed the financial affairs of
Egypt under the Khedives. Francophone and usually a resident
of Parts, the Pasha was appointed the Catholicos· personal
representative to the London conference on the Balkan Wars in
1912. Armenians have often sought to send representatives to
international conferences. In the absence of recognition by the
great powers of a formal government-in -exile, other forms of
sanctioned contact at the diplomatic level or between equivalent
organizations have been a mode of self-legitimation for both the
Armenians and others: the recognition of even a health organization that acts in the name of an exile community is considered
(not always wrongly) a step towards the possibility of greater
participation in the international arena, and it always legitimates
the sponsors of the move in the community. The Pasha 's appointment. while of no immediate diplomatic consequence, was part
of a campaign to regain ground for the old elite .
The significance of this step became manifest after the
First World War . Earlier, between 1911 and 1913, a troika had
seized control of the "ItUhad ve Terakki" Party which ruled the
Ottoman empire . As its war against Russia began to go badly in
December, 1914, the Party used its total control of the apparatus
of the mobilized state to launch the genocide of its Armenian
subjects. Between 1915 and 1917 , some 1.5 million Armenians
were killed and nearly half a million made refugees . By mid-191 7.
military fortunes reversed as the Russians collapsed under the
impact of their Revolution, and the resurgent Ottoman armies
came close to conquering the portion of the Armenian homeland
that had hitherto been under Russian protection; the genocide
threatened to become total.
In a moment of unrivalled crisis, Armenians turned to the
AzkayinKhorhourt.
literally the National Council, which already
existed, but whose task it now became to coordinate the efforts
of all surviving Armenians, whatever their class or faction. It ls
indicative of the importance of the intrastate diaspora that this
government of exiles met in Tbilisi, then the administrative
center of the Transcaucasus.
It mobilized funds, medicine and
supplies and kept thousands alive in the chaos of 1917-1918;
but the most visible "savior" of the population was a ragtag army
- consisting of Armenians trained in the Tzartst army and of the
underground militia of the Dashnags - that held the Ottoman
forces at bay after the Tzartst army dissolved . When the sovereign
Armenian state was founded on May 28, 1918 , Aram Manoogian.
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a Dashnag leader, was given (provisional) dictatorial powers. and
when free Parliamentary elections were held in 1919, the Dashnags won an overwhelming victory among the one million surviving _Am1enians who lived in the new republic.
However, many Annenians lived in various forms of exile
_ some as survivors in refugee camps, others safe in Paris or
Moscow. Boston or Cairo. While they also celebrated the new
state. they def erred to the conservative bourgeoisie whose wealth
and political ambitions were intact, and who were reluctant to
acknowledge the militant intellectuals and peasant soldiers of
the Dashnag party as the legitimate leaders of the nation. Their
hopes for contesting the issue crystallized around Boghos Noubar Pasha.
Several factors were at work: first, the Dashnags had
been a party of exile, but. having come to power in a nation-state,
seemed prepared to claim priority for it and themselves in all
political matters. Yet the bourgeoisie of the diaspora knew that
its wealth and contacts with European leaders were indispensable . The old "DelegationM to London, which in 1912 had
consisted of the Pasha and his entourage, became the frame for
a loose coalition to contest the claims of the Dashnag government
of the new Republic to sole leadership, while managing not to
seem to threaten the fragile state itself 1•. It was a delicate task.
all the more so because as the peace conferences which were to
arrange the map of postwar Europe became urgent realities in
1919, a question was posed that characterizes the exilic nature
of Armenian political life to the fullest: would the nation be
represented solely by those who legitimately ruled the new
nation-state, or would it also be represented by leaders of the
still-exile sector of the nation, whose legitimacy was due not to
election but to tradition and the fact that they performed services
carried out by government functionaries in other polities? The
question is familiar to experts on the relations between the
Jewish Diaspora and Israel. It is also a question likely to emerge
in the event of Palestinian nationhood. since at this point there
are around two million Palestinians in the old home territories
and nearly three million in diaspora.
The Annenian solution was a damaging compromise. The
contestants needed each other. The bourgeois elite could not
openly challenge the leaders of the longed-for state, whose
existence was joyfully celebrated by its constituency, whether in
salons or survivors' camps. In turn, the Dashnags were a party
in control of a government that had to have help from those
leaders who remained relatively wealthy in the overseas diaspora
or the Transcaucasus. These leaders were allied with their fellow
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upper bourgeoisie in the "West," in Cairo and Parts - with the
followers of the Pasha. The extraordinary compromise forged by
the mediation of the Khorhourt was to go to the conferences of
Versailles and Sevres (1919-1920) with two delegations, a MNatlonal" delegation headed by the Pasha and the Republic's
delegation. many of whose members were revolutionary intellectuals led by Avetis Aharonian, a writer not necessarily suited to
diplomacy but a "cultural producer" whose immensely popular,
politicized stories had mobilized the Dashnags· mass following
for two decades 17 •
There is no scholarly work in any language that fully
assesses the impact of this double presence of the Republic and
exile governments at the peace conferences 1•. Some of the
correspondence of the Republic's Dashnag leaders has been
published, and their assessment is more negative than their
public stance at the time, which amounted to saying that the
prevailing cooperative spirit transcended the tensions. The dissenting private assessments .. point to the fact that Western,
especially British diplomats preferred to discuss matters With
the urbane and wealthy Pasha than With a poorly funded radical
like Aharonian. There is evidence that the Pasha negotiated with
Kurdish and French representatives Without consulting With
Aharonian; representing the survivors of Ottoman Armenians,
his delegation had somewhat different territorial ambitions.
Beyond that, it is difficult to assess the specifically diasporan
interests which it sought to promote. Was there a specifically
exile view of what the new Armenian Republic should be? The
question may not have seemed urgent when the U.S. recognized
the Republic (April, 1920) and others followed suit (France,
Britain, Japan, Italy, Brazil, Belgium, Persia, Georgia, Azerbaijan). and promises were made to the Armenian victims of
Ottoman Turkey. But by the summer of 1919 Mustapha Kemal
(Ataturk) had launched the struggle which. coupled With the rise
of the Soviet State. would catch the new republic in a pincer and
eliminate it before all but the most modest hopes of the Armenians were realized.
The existence of two delegations in Parts was to prove
prophetic of the future divisions of post-genocide exile. On
December 2, 1920, the Dashnag government of the Armenian
Republic surrendered to the Red Army, on generous conditions
which were immediately violated as the nascent secret police
began to arrest and execute Dashnag leaders. On February 18,
1921, a Dashnag-organtzed revolt sought to overthrow the
Communists; a doomed struggle continued until July 1921. after
which the surviving members of the Dashnag government fled to
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France, where they Joined the members of the Republic's delegauon to the 1919-1920 peace conferences .
Government-in-Exile and After: The Contemporary Moment
By 1921, the population distribution of the Armenian
nation had changed radically. Three fourths of the world's
surviving Armenians lived in the USSR: just over a million in the
Armenian SSR and half a million as an intrastate diaspora . In
Ataturk's new Turkey, 125,000 Armenians were left, cowed and
no longer permitted to take part in any non-religious activity.
(Today only 55,000 are left.) Around half a million Armenians
lived in Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Greece, France and the
U.S.A. later also in Australia, Canada and Argentina. The
problems facing the exile leadership were both massive and new:
who would lead? to what purpose, given that the larger proportion of the homeland was denuded of Armenians and incorporated into the territory of the Turkish Republic, with the assent
of the Western signatories totheTreatyofLausanne
(1923), while
the rest was part of the USSR?
In 1921, the government-in-exile was acknowledged by
one country. France. The lack of a more general recognition was
not itself an insurmountable problem: other exile governments
suivive thanks to the patronage of one major state. France's
position owed much to the fact that Armenian refugees who were
former citizens of the defunct Ottoman and Tzarist empires had
neither documentation nor citizenship. The government-in-exile
issued identity-cards to Armenian refugees. which also functioned as passports across European boundaries. That was the
primary service they extended to their impoverished co-nationals
until early 1924, when France recognized the Turkish Republicand the USSR In the immediate postwar Diaspora, the government-in -exile was wholly dependent on the Dash nags: most of its
members had been party members all along, and with the fall of
the Republic they reverted to it. Among Armenian supporters,
they were revered as reminders of past hopes. Bearing the name
WBadvtragootyun" (Delegation). the shell of the government-inexile was maintained, in a Paris building and museum, until
1939. then again from 1945 to 1965, when even the pretence
lapsed.
However, as this essay has argued throughout, the
Armenian diaspora had long been organized and governed by
elites who performed services and had access to human, ideological and fiscal resources. While these resources were a pale
shadow of their prewar selves, there were enough militants and
embittered sympathizers among the survivors to reconstitute the
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old organizations, which debated and continue to debate questions concerning exile government.
Among the issues that have remained important to this
day is the role of the Annenian Soviet Socialist Republic 1n the
diaspora . After 1921 it was clear that the final arbiter of the SSR's
affairs was the Kremlin: the SSR was powerless to defend
Annenians in the Soviet intrastate diaspora (e.g. Karabagh was
attached to the Turkic Azerbaijani SSR. thus laying the foundations for renewed conflict during Gorbachev's reign). On the
other hand, the SSR was the only intact part of the homeland,
and an Annenian Communist Party ruled it as the Kremlin's
satrap. What was to be its role vis a vis the exile leadership in
largely capitalist countries? The question. debated by exiles
since 1923, has been whether they should seek to be Uunior)
allies of the SSR. hence of the USSR. or independent actors.
Because of anti-Bolshevism and the Cold War , the former
position has long been a difficult one to maintain, yet tenable 1n
so far as the segment of the exile elite which took it supervised
the "traffic" of people and cultural groups to and from Soviet
Annenia. Ironically, driven by anxiety about Dashnag legitimacy
as the heir of the Republic and by the possible claim that realism
meant accepting the primacy of the SSR. the Annenian
bourgeoisie 's elites (AGBU. ADL, the clergy obedient to the
Catholicos in Annenia) became the allies of the SSR. The
Dashnag Party took the position that the diaspora must maintain an independent government of exile, with the hope of
eventually returning to power in Annenia . This party. though
more radical than those of the upper bourgoise , received U.S.
support during the Cold War.
Other issues that have mattered to the debates of the
exiles include the provision of sexvices: the question of what to
do, in the aftermath of Genocide, given that the new Turkish
Republic not only absolved itself of any responsibility for the
genocide its predecessor state had perpetrated but also denied
the event had happened: what territorial claims. if any, a
government of exile could sustain in a world of nation-states.
where neither the League of Nations nor the U.N. Charter make
provision for the pursuit of such claims; and what, if anything,
can be done to stem the rising assimilation of Annenians in the
Western diaspora.
The question of services has been differently addressed
across the diaspora . In the Middle East. before nationalism and
oil money altered the situation in the l 960's, governments were
unable or unwilling to provide services toAnnenian refugees and
their descendants . Here, funds raised in the Armenian-American
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diaspora played a key role, which meant that theAGBU andADL
eUtes. with better access to such funds. gained a greater legitimacy from administering aid than the relatively poorer Dashnags. But both used their fiscal resources skillfully. The immiserated refugees had been reasonably well educated in the schools
of the prewar Armenian system of intrastate exile: Arab governments and their colonial masters (British and French) welcomed
the .Armenians' ability to care for themselves. The result in
Lebanon (where the confessional state has always been weak)
was the creation of Armenian enclaves with Armenian mayors in
which the principal language of daily life is Armenian, where
separate hospitals and old-age homes exist. as does an Armenian
college: there are designated Armenian seats in Parliament. for
which the Dashnags fight and usually win electoral battles
agatnst other factions. Finally, in Lebanon the Dashnag and
Hnchag parties have militias. The Armenian Middle East has its
own Catholicos, inferior in status but not in influence to the one
1n the USSR, and a strong Armenian intelligentzia and press. in
which debate is fierce. While the Lebanese civil war (after 1975)
and the Iranian revolution (after 1979) have left these communities a pale shadow of their former selves, its emigrants have
moved West (some 150,000 to Los Angeles) and brought much of
their vigor with them. Between 1975 and 1983. a few such
Armenians in Beirut launched a new episode of transnational
terrorism.
That terrorism resulted from the breakdown of the consensus prevailing among the elites of the government of exile.
and especially the Dashnags. since the last outburst of Armenian
terrorism. between 1919 and 1923. The earlier episode. though
murky , is linked to the later. In 1919, the Dashnag Party set up
a special revenge unit. Nemesis. whose existence was deniable by
both the Party and the government of the Republic. Over three
years, the unit assassinated some of the top executives of the
~Ittihad" Party responsible for the genocide• 0 • In 1922-1923, in a
still partially-secret debate at a Party Congress, Dashnag officials debated whether to continue armed struggle against Turkey
by carrying out terrorism and minor guerrilla raids. and whether
the Party had a task appropriate to the new conditions. One
official, H. Kachaznuni, argued that "The Dashnagtzootyun No
Longer Has Anything To Do," that the party should dissolve itself
and let a new diasporan agenda and party emerge. (True to his
opinions. he resigned and returned to Soviet Armenia). The
Dashnags chose to go on. but armed struggle was abandoned. In
1931-1934. a group of cadres. including some of the most
promising, were expelled because they demanded a return to at
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least occasional terrorism as a symbol substantiating the exile
government's claims that the genocide was still an issue. that
Armenian territories would be reclaimed some day. and that the
exiles still had armed force (however puny). an essential feature
of government. along with Mmartyrs" ready to fight in its name••.
When the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union. two fonner
commanders of the prewar militias sought Dashnag sponsored
Armenian units to fight Stalin and Mliberate" Armenia. They
failed. but kept alive the question of when exiles should fight,
against whom. and under what aegis . During the first Lebanese
civil war ( 1958). Dashnag and Hnchag militias fought each other
in a minuscule Armenian civil war embedded within the larger
conflict for control of the machinery and substantial income of
the exile government in Lebanon . This fratricidal conflict underscores the importance of exile government to daily life in the
Armenian diaspora .
Memories of these conflicts were fresh between 1965 and
1975, the decade of the incubation of terrorism in articles and
meetings; unaffiliated youth as well as cadres of the Hnchag and
especially Dashnag parties. influenced by the PLO, disturbed by
the erasure of the Genocide from Western historiography, the exclusion of Armenian demands from international agendas, anci
by the quietism of elites, debated armed struggle . An underground faction, ASAI.A, launched Armenian terrorism in 1975
and was Joined by other groups. Before it stopped in 1983-1985,
ASAI.A terrorists had assassinated half a dozen Dashnag leaders
of the exile government. as well as Turkish diplomats and others
in Western Europe and North America" . In the 1970's. attempts
to create a new pan-Armenian organization. non-violent but supportive of some ASAI.Ademands. led to the short-lived Armenian
World Congress . Rejecting all these groups but riding a renewal
of diasporan commitment. new organizations have explored alternative paths. One example is the Solidarite Franco-Arrnenienne. which successfully lobbied the European Parliament to
issue the Strasbourg Resolution of June 18, 1987: in response
to Turkish abuses of Armenians, Kurds and Cypriot Greeks. the
Parliament demanded reforms as a precondition of Turkey's
admission to the Common Market. A transnational community
dealt with a supranational agency to influence a sovereign
nation, in a move which may prefigure one future direction of
action by the Armenian government of exile.
Elsewhere, competition in the exile elite has been at the
level of community development and patronage of cultural
production . Armenians living in France or the U.S .A.. for example. do not require the level of services needed in parts of the
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Middle East. but the construction of specifically Annenian day
schools (there are 20 in the U.S. A) . churches ( 107). newspapers
and other communal facilities demands the raising and expenditure of tens of millions of dollars every year and employs
hundreds. Millions are also raised and channeled to needy
Arlllenians overseas. as for example after the December 1988
earthquake to Soviet Annenia. Such activity is accompanied by
discursive war within what some community leaders now pref er
to call the leadership of the ethnic community, rather than the
exile government of a diaspora, though there remains considerable overlap between the two concepts. All but two leading
.Armenian organizations in the U.S.A. are still transnational and
have to deal with tensions between their ethnic and diasporan
inclinations. Of the exceptions, one. the Annenian Assembly, is
organized as a Washington lobbying effort, but a vacuum of
leadership elsewhere is increasingly causing it to become the
leading organization of Annenians in Amelica. The other. the
Zoryan Institute, is an innovative think-tank which consults
with diasporan and Soviet Annenian analysts of the Armenian
condition. shaping a new pan-Annenlan discourse while retaining its American base.
The transnational nation is on the verge of another
political transformation, due to Gorbachev's reforms, the Karabagh issue and the attacks upon Armenians in Soviet Azerbaijan
(over 100 have been killed and 200,000 have fled or have been
deported) 23 , the earthquake and, above all. the popular reform
movement in Armenia. These events evoke the genocide, the
earthquake does so because of its unusual destructiveness, the
Karabagh crtsis because Azelis are attempting to expel Armenians from the last fragment of historical Armenia outside the SSR
still inhabited by a majority Annenian population. Lost people
and lost lands evoke loss, the central experience of exiles. The
feeling has mobilized the diaspora. and the easing of constraints
on contacts between Soviet Armenian and exile leaders makes
transnational action more likely.
It is now easier for the exile government to deal with and
perhaps to influence Soviet Armenian leaders than it has ever
been. Of course. the reverse is theoretically also true, but in fact
the delegitimation ofall things Soviet is so complete that the exile
government is more confident of itself than it has been for
decades. The ADL faction, which for too long served as the SSR's
junior partner, is discredited; the Armenian Assembly is courted
by Soviet Armenia for its access to U.S.-Armenian capital and to
Congress. and as a result is growing in influence and prestige in
the diaspora. The Dashnags. in particular. are bolstered by the
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fact that the outlawed flag of the Republic they governed is again
the flag of the Armenian SSR. Dashnag heroes are rehabilitated,
and demonstrators have called for its legalization as an opposition party inside the Armenian SSR The elites of the extle
government matter more than before, and different elites matter
differently. The age-old dream of a pan-Armenian polity jointly
led by consulting and cooperating elites at home and in diaspora
is once again a beckoning temptation. Without a nation-state to
call their own, the Armenians still seek their transnational
nation. The enduring shape of the Armenian polity provides a
model for those collectivities which for the foreseeable future Will
ex1st in the global system as nations with a small home territory
and a large overseas population led by an "exileMor diasporan
elite.

FOOTNOTES
•Quoted in Yossi Shain, The Frontier of Loyalty: Political
Exile in the Age of the Nation-State (Middletown, Ct.: Wesleyan
University Press, 1989), p.113.
•Ibid., p. 165.
3111ecentral role of political culture in defining the
authentic aspirations and interests of the exile polity is the
subject of my manuscript, Stateless Power: RepresentatfDn and
Hegemony in the Armenian Diaspora, in progress.
•Daniel J. O'Neil offers an interesting if not fully convincing argument that modern Irish nationalism is an example of
"successful nation-building on the part of an enclave-people. MJ.
of Ethnic Studies 15:3 (Fall, 1987), pp. 1-27.
51be archaic classical Armenian used by the clergy
endured. Otherwise. there was a multiplication and fragmentation of dialects. See Marc Nichanian, Ages at Usages de laLangue
Annenienne (Paris: Editions Entente. 1989).
•Informed speculation about the extent to which the old
leadership survived to become the core of new elites continues
among historians. The best recent work is by Robert Hewsen,
"Artsrunid House of Sefedinian: Survival of a Princely Dynasty in
Ecclesiastical Guise, MJ. of the Society for Armenian Studies.,, I
(1984). pp. 133-137 and "In Search of Armenian Nobility,MJSAS ..
III (1987), pp. 93-118.
7
Philip Curtin originated the term to refer to an African
phenomenon. but it has been applied to the Armenians by Bruce
Masters, The Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the
Middle East (N.Y.: NYU Press). 1988.
•For a comparable case. one has to look at earlier rather
144

than more contemporary cases. The best parallel is the extensive
civic andjurtdical independence enjoyed by the Jewish diaspora
of ptolemaic Egypt ca. 300 B.C. - 30 B.C. See David Konstan.
"Ethnicity and Citizenship" (unpublished MS) and A. N. SherwtnWhite. Racial Prejudice in Imperial Rome (Cambrtdge: Cambridge
U.K.).

•Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities: Reflections
on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism... London: Verso. 1983.
PP· 41-49. makes this potnt, as does Barnett Rubtn elsewhere tn
this volume. wrtting about the Afghans. Anthony Hyman suggests that new religio-political forms of organization developed by
Afghan resistance groups cut across traditional clan and regional loyalties and may lead to the creation of a genutne Islamic
Afghan nation. ~eAfghan Politics of Exile." Third World Quarterly
9 (1). January 1987, pp. 67-84. I am grateful to Dr. Gerard
Libaridyan for his comments on the David Beg rebellion.
10 Khachig Tololyan.
"Cultural Narrative and the Motivauon of the Terrorist." J. StrategicStudtes(l0:4).
December 1987.
pp. 217-233.
11 For the full and fascinating
story. see Nichanian. op. ciL
A very unusual diasporan organization. the Mekhitartst Brotherhood. an Armenian Catholic order with monasteries in Venice
and Vienna but with emissartes everywhere. played a large role
tn creattng the ideology of nationhood and in reshaptng the
Armenian language: these clerics educated important segments
of the non-Catholic laity as nationalistsand
hold a singular
position tn Armenian history that has few parallels elsewhere.
12
A better analogy may be oiTered by the Bulgarization of
the language and national self-identification of the South-Slavic
population of Macedonia in the late ntneteenth century. to which
exiles contributed significantly. For the best account, see Duncan Perry. The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Revolutionary
Movements. 1893-1903 (Duke University Press, 1988). Ch. I.
13
Vahe Oshagan. "Haruyr Dart Arach" ("One Hundred
Years Ago," a study of the literary milieu of Ottoman Armenia).
Asbarez .. July 22. 1989. pp. 10, 36.
1
4The image of the iron ladle marches through the major
discussions of whether the use of force - in the form of terrorism
- makes sense in the conditions of exile tn the post-Genocide
Armenian diaspora (1923-1989). These discussions played a
major role tn the struggle against the authority of the leading
diasporan elite, the Dashnags. tn 1931-1934 and 1965-1975.
The last dispute, unresolved. led to the resurgence of Armenian
terrortsm after 1975. The terrorists explicitly potnted to the PLO's
claims to betng the de facto government of the Palestinian people.
145

asserting that this was based in part on their use of armed force.
A faction of the Armenian Secret Anny for the Liberation of
Armenia (ASAIA) published an underground journal named
Yergaleh Sherep .. "Iron Ladle," in Athens and Beirut in the early
to mid-1980's.
1
~his part of the essay focuses on the Dashnag struggle
against non-Armenians. Like most competitors for leadership,
however, the Dashnags conducted an intra-Armenian struggle,
both in exile and at home. against traditional groups to their right
and radical socialists to their left; this struggle ranged from ugly
mutual polemic to kidnappings of the rich to raise funds, and
occasional assassination of informers and rival leaders. Though
Dashnag strategy developed piecemeal, its factions debated
whether they were (to use Lenin's later term) a "vanguard party"
that would lead and teach the masses. whether the Party was the
model of the Nation to be, which it helped to make (kerteO. or
whether the Party was the Nation . This last position resembles
that of the Indian Congress Party. which identified itself with an
actually heterogeneous and fictional "India." See G. Chaliand,
Terrorism (London: Saqi Books, 1987). p. 26.
1
•Boghos Noubar Pasha had impeccable credentials as a
philanthropist
and diasporan diplomat who had pe:rformed
quasi-governmental roles. He commanded no armed force. but
had helped to organize the Legion d'Orient, a unit of Armenians
commanded by French officers which fought against the Turks
in Egypt, Palestine and Syria during World War I ( 1916-1918).
Part of the mass appeal of the Dashnag Party was due
to its role in cultural production and to the loyalty it commanded
from politicized artists and intellectuals (publicists and editors,
teachers). For a survey of the role of cultural production in
resistance movements of all kinds, see Barbara Harlow. Resis tance Uterature (NY: Methuen, 1987).
••James Gidney's judgment in A Mandate for Armenia
(Kent State University Press. 1967) is contradicted by the available evidence. He writes: "while it is not to be expected that a
popular party like the Dashnagtzootyun would always see eye to
eye with a group backed chiefly by the clergy and the bourgeoisie.
the Armenians (in the two delegations) stuck together during the
critical spring months of 1919 (when the Versailles Conference
was being arranged). There is nothing at all to support the charge
that their own factionalism cost them" (p. 85). This is a breathtakingly confident generalization from a scholar who had no
access to most sources in Armenian.
1
!ffhe most important of these are the memoirs of Simon
Vratzian, the last prime minister of the short-lived Republic,
17

146

whose works have been published by the Dashnag Party in the
diaspora . While usually accurate. Vratzian's portrayal of the
situation cannot be taken as wholly reliable. After 1920, all such
depictions were interventions in the renewed struggle to control
diasporan political institutions. I have relied primarily on Antz inkNviryalk(Beirut:
Hamazkayin Press, 1969), in whichVratzian
cites the letters of eyewitnesses and participants who were in
parts at the crucial time, like Karekin Pasdermajian.
o'fhere is no foreign-language study of this movement.
but the French journalist Jacques Derogie based a well -re searched political thriller on the events: Operation Nemesis
2

(Paris: Fayard), 1986.

See this author's "Martyrdom as Legitimacy/ Contem porary Research on Terrorism, eds. P. Wilkinson and A. Stewart
21

(Aberdeen : Aberdeen U.P., 1987). pp. 89-103 .
21\vo books and several articles offer an overview of this
phase of Armenian terrorism. However. they discuss international issues. not the intranational context - struggle over exile
government - which made terrorism seem an option. See
Michael Gunther (Pursuing the Just Cause ojTheir People. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 1986) and Anat Kurtz and Ariel
Merari. ASAIA, Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies,
1986. and their review by this author in Conflict Quarterly
(Summer 1988). pp . 101-105 .
2
3The under-reporting of these events in the US press is
one more indication of Amertcan unwillingness to do anything
that might make Gorbachev's position seem less secure . It is a
measure of local anarchy that the Soviet authorities allow
disputes between the republics to be solved by small massacres
ofArmenians and by mass deportations (fearing reprisal, 170,000
Azerts have left the ASSR). For a rare, albeit passing, mention of
the killings see: Rasma Karklins. "Perestroika and Ethnopolitics
in the USSR". PS: Political Science and Politics, 21 :2 (June 1989).
p. 213 .
2

147

